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Abstract
This study seeks to build upon the limited body of research that focuses on the causes and effects of
governmental corruption. With an emphasis on supplementing previous findings and expanding
their scope, this study seeks to identify factors that explain variations in the level of corruption
between different jurisdictions. This study uses federal conviction data from the 50 US states to
measure corruption, controlling for population and government employees, the latter of which has
not been done previously. To identify and quantify independent variables, this study employed
various governmental, scholarly and nonprofit sources. New variables were employed while also
enlisting previously studied variables. This study observes linear associations between these two
sets of variables, and models them using linear and quadratic regressions. The data suggests that
most previously studied variables had observed relationships with corruption that concur with the
findings of previous scholars, although the strength of these relationships varied. Several previously
untested variables also appear to have important relationships with corruption. When conducting
regression analyses, it appears that state poverty rates and GINI indexes best explain variation in
states’ corruption levels. The proportion of state legislative seats held by women, high school
diploma attainment (or higher) rates, and to a lesser extent, voter eligible turnout, also explained
these differences.
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Introduction
The idea of corruption raises images like the time of mafia rule in major American cities or
the political corruption of the Watergate scandal. These images make corruption seem like a passing
moment in history, but corruption is still widespread today. In 2017, federal prosecutors in Florida
convicted a former US Congresswoman of 18 counts of an indictment that charged her with
participating in a conspiracy surrounding a fraudulent charity. The Congresswoman and her coconspirators were found to have solicited more than $800,000 in charitable donations by falsely
telling donors that their money would be used for educational scholarships and that the organization
was a properly registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. $1,200 of this money was used for
scholarships, the rest was used to benefit the perpetrators (US Department of Justice, 2017).
Separately, in late 2017, a federal procurement officer was convicted of money laundering and wire
fraud for orchestrating a scheme to fraudulently obtain a $2.3 million federal contract. This officer
obtained the funds using a shell company and then siphoned at least $600,000 in checks from the
company for personal use.
Corruption is not limited to the national level. In 2018, former New York State Assembly
Speaker Sheldon Silver was found to have received about $4 million in bribes and an additional $1
million from money laundering in exchange for official acts, some of which were diverting budget
funds to favorable parties (US Department of Justice, 2018). In early 2017, a police officer with the
Windsor, North Carolina Police Department was found guilty of drug, firearm and bribery charges
after accepting $6,500 and firearms from federal agents posing as drug traffickers in exchange for
trafficking 30 kilograms of heroin to Maryland (US Department of Justice, 2017). These examples
are a very small piece of the entire picture, some of 6,417 individuals prosecuted by federal law
enforcement for corruption-related crimes from 2011-2017 (US Department of Justice, 2017).
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Beyond individual cases, some observers argue that the United States faces systemic
corruption. That is, corruption has become ingrained in American governmental culture. In 2014, a
Gallup poll found that 75% of Americans believed corruption to be widespread in the United States,
which was an increase from 67% in 2007 (Gallup, 2015). Last year, the United States received its
lowest Transparency International rating in eight years, ranking 23rd, which ranks countries
annually according to levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2020). And in 2006, a
CNN/ORC poll found that 50% of Americans agreed that most members of Congress were corrupt.
Given its ability to harm public trust, it is important to understand the conditions that
promote high levels of corruption. But as the next section will indicate, the present literature on
corruption is limited. With a focus on variation in US states, this study seeks to synthesize several
gaps in the literature. This study addresses a lack of comparability by analyzing variables across
several categories (economic, educational, etc.) using the same methodology. Limitations of scope
are addressed by selecting a broad set of variables, many of which have not been previously tested.
Lastly, this study addresses limited support by testing previously studied variables. I also include a
wide range of explanations for corruption, incorporating two measures of the dependent variable
(one not utilized before). In all, these efforts provide an important contribution to the understanding
of corruption.
This paper is organized into five major sections excluding the introduction: literature review,
data methods, data results, data limitations, and discussion. The literature review section outlines
the ongoing debate about defining corruption and existing hypotheses about previously studied
variables. The data methods section explains my choices to measure corruption and the independent
variables, and the various hypotheses and limitations thereof. The data results section presents the
analysis’ correlational and regression findings, while the data limitations section indicates some of
2

the limitations of these findings. The discussion section highlights the implications of these results
and their meaning for future research and policy development.
Literature Review
The literature on public corruption aims to answer three fundamental questions: what causes
corruption, how does corruption affect society, and what policy actions can be taken to decrease the
incidence of corruption?1 But before we can begin to design studies to answer such questions, we
must understand how corruption itself is defined. How scholars define corruption shapes the focus,
methods, and results of their research (Jain, 2001; Philp, 1997), which makes it an important item
for discussion.
Intuitively, defining corruption might appear straightforward, as the term is commonly used
in daily life, appearing in, for example, political rhetoric and the news media (Slattery, 2019;
Surcio, 2014), yet few explicitly define it. This fact extends to some of the literature, with many
authors likely assuming people have a common understanding of the term’s meaning. However, in
the literature, like in society at large, there is significant disagreement on what exactly constitutes
corruption. The modern Oxford Dictionary has nine separate definitions of the term (Burke, 1997).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a similarly intricate definition of the term (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2016). Scholars are similarly divided in how they define the term, diverging on
their ideological, cultural, and professional differences (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Jain, 2001; Lessig,
2013). For example, some scholars define corruption based on its content, such as if the act was
petty, like stealing paper from a government office, or grand, like taking bribes from a contractor
(Jain, 2001). Other scholars attribute corruption to being an institutional attitude, such as a

1The

literature focuses primarily on corruption in public entities but some scholars’ analysis includes observing
unethical behavior in entities like labor unions and business organizations.
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collectively lax attitude toward enforcing ethics laws (Johnston & Zimring, 2005). These
differences impact what gets shaped and modeled in research.
The most frequently used definition of corruption is “the use of public office for private
gain” (Heywood, 1997; Hogsdon & Jiang, 2007; Jos, 1993; Lessig, 2013). According to this
definition, a local government employees’ use of information obtained in confidential briefings to
guide their private investment would be considered corrupt, as this individual knowingly used their
position for their own private benefit. Some scholars support this definition because its simplicity
limits the ability of researchers’ ideology to shape the substance of the research. These scholars
argue that more detailed definitions (for example, one that includes gifting as a corrupt act) are
more likely to be influenced by researchers’ ideology, which in turn may be impacted by cultural
background, introducing a lurking variable to the analysis (Hazy et al., 2016; Pellegrini, 2011)2.
Economists usually subscribe to this definition and use the term “personal gain” instead of private
gain, usually because their research tends to focus on cost-benefit analyses of individuals’ actions.
These analyses usually observe the benefit individuals derive from corrupt acts and treat financial
gain as the sole motivation of corruption (Hogdson & Jiang, 2007; Jain, 2001). The simplicity and
malleability of this definition makes it attractive to many researchers.
This common definition faces several criticisms, however. According to Hogdson and Jiang
2007, it ignores the existence of “noble cause” corruption, which is when the act is carried out for a
purpose other than private or personal gain (For example, when an individual engages in a corrupt
act to expose a purported injustice occurring inside government). Hogdson and Jiang (2007), along
with Johnston (2005) and Kauffman and Vicente (2011), also contest that this definition omits

2

This argument can be demonstrated with an example. In some African countries professional gifting is accepted and
even encouraged as part of the culture. A gift to an elected official, therefore, may not have the same intent to influence
as may be true in the United States where such activity is more regulated.

4

entire sectors where corruption is relevant and damaging, such as corporate or labor corruption,
both of which have federal and state statutes governing unethical behavior. It is also important to
remember that the simplicity of this definition allows for uncertainty when determining what
actions are corrupt. Take a situation where an elected official takes an action because they perceive
it to benefit their political prospects. Some might argue this is corrupt because that individual’s
political fortunes provide them with private benefits. Others could say elevating oneself politically
could be altruistic, as the official may support their political fortunes because they believe it to be in
the public interest. Definitions of corruption rely heavily on perception, which is important to
remember when considering how studies are modeled.
Some scholars contend that corruption can become “institutional”, meaning that in an
organization there is a systemic and persistent incentive for members to act in ways that are
contrary to the organization’s purpose or that damages the trustworthiness of that institution
(Lessig, 2013; Marquette & Pieffer, 2015; Morris, 2011). These scholars take the view that how
widespread corruption is in an organization undoubtedly plays a role in the cost-benefit decision of
an individual actor (For example, a corrupt organization lowers the possibility of law enforcement
detection). Lessig 2013 contends that organizational actors with good intentions may
unintentionally act in corrupt ways because of their institutional environment.
The diversity of ideas on the meaning of corruption can be demonstrated by outlining the
different ways corruption is measured. Most scholars adopt one of three approaches, which can
commonly be categorized as the legal, public interest, and public opinion-based approaches (Jain,
2001). The legal view is based on the rules set out in statutes and judicial opinions. These scholars
rely on these public institutions to determine what actions are corrupt. Bribery, for example, is
barred by federal law, which this framework would consider to be corrupt. The public interest
5

perspective takes the view that an act is corrupt if it harms the public interest, even if the act is not
illegal. For example, this methodology may consider a dinner between lobbyists and public officials
to be corrupt, as it is perceived to undermine the public interest, even though the act may not violate
any laws. Finally, the public opinion approach defines corruption based on the public’s general
perspective. For example, if Americans believe taking campaign contributions from corporations is
corrupt, scholars adhering to this framework would consider such acts to be corrupt (Johnston &
Zimring, 2005). Most studies on corruption use one of these three basic methodologies to measure
corruption.
Like all methodologies, these approaches have shortcomings. The legal definition is
commonly criticized for its shifting meaning and the narrowness of how the courts have interpreted
the constitution to protect against corruption. For example, the Supreme Court in recent decades has
altered its view of quid pro quo corruption. In Buckley v Valeo (1970), the court found that
corruption through an indirect quid pro quo action like a campaign contribution (a direct action
would be explicitly stating the relationship) was not substantial enough to regulate, though in Austin
v Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) the court ruled against its previous decision, allowing a
state law substantially regulating these actions to remain in effect. Subsequently, in Citizens United
v FEC (2010), the court reverted to its Buckley position, narrowing the scope of what could be
considered criminally corrupt3.
Critics contend that these inconsistencies influence prosecutorial data, as prosecutors’
activeness in pursuing corruption is likely impacted by the strength of the precedent underpinning

To imagine how these rulings might impact one’s view of corruption, consider the following question: If an elected
official takes an official action because an interested party will donate to his or her campaign as a result of that official
action, is the elected official engaging in a quid pro quo? The Buckley and Citizens United courts would say no,
especially if the two parties had not prior communication solidifying that relationship, but the Austin court would likely
say yes. This evolution of law presents highlights a complication when relying on the legal definition.
3
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their legal arguments. Also, critics say that development of criminal statutes is the result of a
political, rather than a rational process, and does not reflect common sense judgement regarding
what is corrupt, which some authors believe to delegitimize this approach (Briffault, 2011; Burke,
1999; Edwards, 1996; Hellman, 2013).
Critics of the public interest framework largely highlight the subjective nature of the term
“public interest”, indicating that such a definition is based on one’s ideology and background. For
example, in some African countries, mixing personal life with governmental duties is normalized,
so scholars in those countries might not view an act in support of a family member’s business, say,
as a corrupt act (Granovetter, 2004; Johnston & Zimring, 2005). This criticism is particularly
relevant to cross-country corruption research, as cultural differences are most significant between
nations (compared to regions within a nation).
Scholars also emphasize that there is no legitimate means of determining if “corrupt” actors
undertook their actions in the interest of the public. Using the earlier example of campaign
contributions, an elected official might believe the action favored by the interested party is in fact
the most viable option for the public. The difficulty then becomes separating seemingly competing
interests. Critics of the public opinion perspective cite similar concerns. Public opinion is similarly
based on ideology and culture, and like the law public opinion is subject to (perhaps more) frequent
change. The public’s view is also not necessarily an accurate measure of corruption in government.
For example, Americans’ view of how corrupt Congress is decreases as their knowledge of
campaign finance law increases (Bowler & Donavan, 2016). This example highlights that
information asymmetries may impact the public’s perception of corruption. Some scholars also
contend that public opinion can be difficult to measure (Heywood, 1997; Jain, 2001; Johnston,
2005).
7

Most corruption scholarship uses the public opinion approach for its data collection. These
studies, usually relying on data at the international level, source their data from the leading ethics
nonprofits, the most prominent of which is Transparency International (Dimant & Tosato, 2017).
This organization surveys residents of various countries and compiles the data into annual reports,
creating an index of corruption. The opinions used to create this index are composed of factors like
the independence of the judiciary, government transparency, and election integrity. The TI index,
like other international indexes, is based on each nation’s perception of these factors (Transparency
International, 2020). Scholars use the data in these reports to study corruption between different
countries, attempting to explain why corruption is more prevalent in certain countries using
different economic, educational, governmental and electoral variables 4.
Those studies that do not adopt the public opinion approach usually use the legal method.
Most of these researchers base their analyses on judicial and agency administrative records, and for
those analyzing US data, the annual reports to Congress published by the Public Integrity Bureau
(PIB) of the US Justice Department. These reports summarize data on ethics-related criminal
enforcement actions taken by each of the 93 US Attorney’s Offices around the country 5. The reports
normally provide the number of federal, state, and local officials charged, convicted, and those
individuals awaiting trial in any given year and for several years prior. These reports do not include
data on white-collar labor and corporate corruption or state and local enforcement actions6 (Glaeser
& Sacks, 2004; Kaufmann, 2005; Pellegrini, 2011).

For international corruption studies, relying on people’s perceptions is a necessity. Most countries do not have strong
public record systems, which makes empirical data collection difficult. Also, the laws of different states vary
substantially, as does the level of enforcement and law enforcement resources. These factors make international
conviction record comparison difficult, leaving public opinion as the only viable alternative.
5 There are no “corruption” statutes in US law, rather these reports encompass those individuals who committed a
bribery, campaign finance or other white-collar crime in the context of their public duties.
6 As states operate independently, there is no comprehensive source for state or local initiated judicial or administrative
ethics enforcement actions.
4
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Data from these reports is normally aggregated to the state level. Researchers then analyze
these statistics in comparison to other variables, normally using standard, multiple, logarithmic or
another modified regression analysis method (Glaeser & Sacks, 2004; Pellegrini, 2011). Many
scholars contend that this method provides raw, actionable data to researchers. Yet some scholars
contend that the quality of these records are dubious, claiming that such records may include
convictions not directly related to corruption and that the records may not be accurately conveyed,
as the PIB collects this data by administering a survey to the US Attorney’s Offices (Cortis &
Mylio, 2013). The vast majority of legal-method scholars, though, contend that the data is reliable.
Scholars who adopt the public opinion approach also face significant lurking variables in
their datasets. While many researchers seek to control for variables that might impact their analyses
(such as democracy, investment, and election year), there are some variables that are more difficult
to control for. For example, many developing countries have populations that live in remote areas,
and these groups may not be represented in surveying efforts. Also, differences in corruption
perception might depend on cultural factors. Controlling for a qualitative variable like culture would
be quite difficult, given the practical difficulties in collecting such data. Finally, comparing
corruption index data over time is problematic, as people’s opinions are subject to change,
especially as new information about their governments are published. For these reasons, it seems
that using the legal measurement methodology, which this study adopts, is a stronger measurement
tool for analyzing corruption.
In pursuit of an answer to the questions of what causes corruption and how it affects society,
scholars have enlisted a myriad of variables. Generally, these variables can be categorized as
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economic, political, and social variables7. Scholars have chosen these variables because they reflect
societal conditions that may or may not be conducive to corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017).
Observing these relationships in turn allows scholars to provide policymakers with guidance on
policies that might decrease corruption—such as increased financial disclosures of public officials.
Scholars who test these variables vary in their methodology, enlisting different data sources (states,
territories, countries) and methods (primarily the public opinion and legal approaches) to analyze
corruption.
Studies of economic variables are the most frequent of the three categories, usually being
undertaken by economists and sometimes by political scientists. The studies mainly observe how
the strength of an economy relates the level of corruption. Scholars primarily employ the change in
real GDP to measure this, although they sometimes use median and average household incomes.
(Jain, 2001; Mauro, 1995). Some scholars contend that corruption is helpful to the economy,
incentivizing bureaucrats to operate more efficiently, as they are financially incentivized to work
and respond to private needs more quickly (Wei, 1999). Others indicate that more corruption
decreases economic investment in a jurisdiction’s economy (resulting from decreased investor
confidence8) and hinders government economic development initiatives. Scholars’ data tends to
support the latter position, though there are still scholars that contend that the former position is the
case, especially for countries with especially high levels of corruption. In highly corrupt countries,
some studies have found that real GDP and the GINI index have a quadratic relationship with
corruption, with corruption increasing as these variables increase until a certain level and then

These variables are reorganized as economic, educational, governmental and electoral variables for the purposes of
this study. This study focuses primarily on economic and political variables, making the traditional three variable type
breakdown less well suited for this study.
8 Investors may have less confidence in a corrupt government because it is less likely to pay off its debts or fairly
administer government programs.
7
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decreasing (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Jain, 2001). In this study I employ the most common
hypothesis, that an increasingly strong economy is associated with a lower level of corruption.
The literature studies economic variables beyond the strength of the economy. Some
economics scholars have conducted studies that focus on how economic incentives might affect
corruption. These studies have focused on indicators like government employee salaries, and they
usually find that increasing salaries reduces the benefit from corrupt acts, thereby reducing
corruption (Johnson et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Many studies were dedicated to observing
how the GINI index and the poverty rate relate to corruption. Generally, they found that corruption
had a direct relationship with both of these variables (Gründler & Potrafke, 2019). Scholars believe
this relationship exists because high corruption is associated with educational inequity, poor quality
social programs, and a biased tax system (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). Some scholars, however, have
found the relationship to be quadratic, with corruption increasing inequality to a zenith and then
decreasing corruption. Most data supporting this finding has been at the international level
(Sulemana & Kpienbaareh, 2018).
Studies involving political (and policy) variables are quite diverse in the measurement tools
they enlist and the types of variables they observe. Like the economic variables, scholars testing
political variables employ both legal and public opinion measurement tools. These studies include
variables like voter turnout, government employee salaries, the complexity of a jurisdiction’s
regulatory system, the level of press and public access to government records, and electoral
competitiveness, to name a few 9. Some factors have shown consistent findings throughout the
literature, such as the size and complexity of government, each of which have not been found to be

The literature generally finds that voter turnout, government employee salaries, government transparency and electoral
competitiveness are negatively related to corruption.
9
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significantly related to corruption (Johnson et al., 2013). Studies that test voter turnout are more
plentiful, but only a portion of those have provided statistically significant results (Dimant &
Tosato, 2017). However, most of these political factors have provided inconclusive results or have
not been tested widely enough to draw inferences.
Studies of social variables encompass anything from analyzing education levels to the
percentage of women in government, to the level of racial or ethnic diversity in a population. These
studies are almost always undertaken by political scientists, and their authors use both the legal and
public opinion methods of corruption measurement. A limited number of studies have found that an
increase in the proportion of women to men serving in government (legislatures, agencies, etc.)
decreases corruption. Similarly, a limited number of studies have found that increased racial
diversity leads to an increase in corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Jain, 2001). Aside from the
education level variable (usually measured by high school or college degree attainment), which
scholars have consistently found to decrease corruption (Li et al., 2000), the trend remains—these
studies provide interesting but inconsistent evidence.
Data and Methods
Because of the limited number of studies conducted and the inconsistent nature of findings,
this study employs a broad set of independent and dependent variables, going further than prior
research. This study is based on annual corruption conviction data from 2011-2017 for all 50 US
states 10. States were preferable to countries because there are fewer opportunities for lurking
variables like cultural and legal differences to impact this study’s results (Glaeser & Saks, 2004).
These years represent the most recent data that is not affected by pending trial results or changes in

There are some exceptions, such as elections data, which was only available for Presidential and midterm elections
(2012, 2014, and 2016).
10
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federal enforcement resulting from Citizens United v FEC (2010). The measurement of corruption
is based on the number of individuals who were convicted of one or more federal crimes that were
related to public corruption11.
The data collected originates from the US Department’s (DOJ) “Annual Report to Congress
on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.” The Public Integrity Section was
created in the 1970s to organize and oversee federal corruption prosecutorial efforts and is required
by federal law to create this annual report for Congress. Individuals prosecuted vary from being
postal workers to agency executives to members of Congress. Most of this data constitutes civil
service officials. Conviction data is provided by US Attorney District, of which there are 94 (US
Department of Justice, 2017). Convictions by district (which makeup different areas of a state or the
entire state) were added for each state to become 50 different state totals. Thus for New York, with
4 US Attorney districts, convictions from each district were added to get a total for New York.
After being combined, the state totals were then controlled for population 12 and the number
of government employees 13 in each state, creating two separate measures of corruption. These
measures are reported as the number of convictions per 100,000 state residents and per 100,000
government employees (federal, state and local), respectively. This was calculated by dividing the
number of convictions by either the total population or government employees in a state, and
multiplying that number by 100,000. The data for state populations was derived from the US
Census Bureau’s 2010 Decennial Census, whereas the data for governmental employees was

Such crimes are diverse, ranging from campaign finance violations to bribery to mail fraud. Who is convicted varies
as well. These reports account for convicted elected officials, agency executives, civil service employees and
accomplices in the private sector. It is also worth noting that there are no “corruption” criminal statutes. Instead,
prosecutors use other criminal statutes and apply them to different scenarios.
12 Previous studies, such as Glaser and Saks (2006) and Apergis, Dincer and Payne (2010), have controlled for
population in a similar manner.
13 This term is defined broadly to include employees of public corporations, public authorities, and part-time employees.
11
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derived using the US Census Bureau’s Annual Census of Governments and the Council on State
Government’s Annual Book of the States Reports. Many previous studies have used the populationcontrolled metric (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Glaeser & Sacks, 2004). There are no know studies that
controlled for government employees 14.
Despite the advantages, these DOJ reports do have some limitations that are worth
mentioning. These reports do not include state and local prosecutions of corruption. Most states
have ethics-relevant statutes, and state Attorney Generals and District Attorneys (sometimes called
County Attorneys) usually have specialized bureaus dedicated to investigating and prosecuting
corruption. Federal prosecutors, though, have the capacity to charge and convict state and local
officials of federal crimes, and they have more actively done so in recent decades (Henning, 2003).
Some scholars have found that the DOJ annual reports are susceptible to inaccuracy, as the reports
are based on a survey distributed to the 94 US Attorney’s Offices. These scholars contend that DOJ
staff make reporting errors and may even fail to submit the survey to the D.C. headquarters of the
DOJ, where the Public Integrity Bureau is headquartered (Cortis & Miylo, 2013).
The data provided in the DOJ Public Integrity Bureau reports are the strongest assessment of
corruption prevalence available. It is the data used most often in the literature (Cortis & Miylo,
2013), and previous studies have found that results using this data show similar correlations to the
findings of corruption theory (Apergis, Dincer, & Payne, 2010). This metric controls for differences
in national, state, and local laws. Also, to some extent, this metric controls for differences in
enforcement discretion, as US Attorneys ultimately answer to the President of the United States,
compared to state Attorneys General or local District Attorneys, who tend to be independently

Controlling for government employees is an important measure because the population of employees does not always
directly relate to population. In states near Washington D.C., for example, there are more federal employees than in
other states with a similar population.
14

14

elected officials. There are also differences in the judiciary such as procedural and legal practice
rules might impact state and local prosecution decisions and results. As a legal measurement of
corruption, these reports are insulated from the deficiencies of the public opinion and public
interest-based measurements. Finally, these reports control for differences in prosecutorial
resources.
The selection of independent variables for analysis was based on the inquiries of previous
scholars, on governmental policies advocated for by so-called good government organizations (For
example, low individual contribution limits for state offices) and on the public’s surveyed beliefs on
the cause(s) of corruption (which usually focused on campaign finance). This study tests the
underlying hypotheses for each of these variables. The intention of this analysis is to augment the
value of the literature by strengthening and expanding it, thereby providing policymakers a more
effective resource to consult when considering policies that may reduce corruption (For example,
evidence showing that legislative term limits decreases corruption may be useful to policymakers).
The exhaustive list of variables tested, the sources of these variable’s data, the relevant variable
hypotheses and the reasoning for adopting these hypotheses can be found in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Selected variables for analysis, their data sources, hypotheses, and reasoning for hypotheses by category. Economic
variables are listed first, followed by education, government and electoral variables. Each category is divided by a border.

How the economy and corruption interact is crucial to understanding and preventing
corruption. Several studies in the literature dedicated themselves to observing how economic
variables relate to corruption. These studies were relatively consistent in their finding that favorable
economic circumstances are negatively related to corruption. Scholars believe this is attributable to
the fact that less corruption increases investor confidence in a jurisdiction, which brings new capital
16

to a local economy. Some scholars also note that government economic development funds are less
likely to be misused in jurisdictions with less corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Johnson et al.,
2010; Gründler & Potrafke, 2019). This study takes a hypothesis that agrees with this literature,
assuming that economic fortunes and corruption have a negative relationship, utilizing several
previously used and underused variables15 to test this assertion.
Economic disparities affect entire societies, which implies that they may also affect
corruption. Scholars have dedicated entire projects to studying how economic disparities affect the
prevalence of corruption. Poverty rates and GINI indexes are the most commonly used measures in
the literature (Dincer & Gunlap, 2008; Gupta et al., 2002; Sonora, 2019), and they are employed in
this study as well. Because most studies on economic disparities were undertaken using an
international opinions-based dataset, studying these data using US states is valuable. Previous
studies usually found a positive relationship between these variables, although there were fewer
studies focusing on poverty than on wealth disparity. Scholars believe this relationship exists
because high poverty and wealth inequality are indicators of poor social service programs and
unequal educational opportunities, which are indicators of high corruption. These facts indicate high
corruption because jurisdictions with poor social service programs and significant educational
inequities usually have misplaced public priorities, which either leads to corruption or is corrupt in
and of itself (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). This study’s hypothesis concurs with these scholars, with the
added caveat that these inequity variables are also associated with low civic engagement (measured
by voter turnout and small donor campaign financing), which this study also believes to be also

Underused variables include Fortune 500 Company Headquarters, State Legislator Salaries, and State and Local
Employee Salaries. The more standard variables are Unemployment Rate, GDP Growth Rate and Median Household
Income.
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connected to high corruption levels as decreased civic engagement reduces the likelihood that
public priorities reflect the need of society.
Educational attainment was the most consistently supported variable with respect to its
purported negative relationship with corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Glaeser & Saks, 2004;
Grannovetter, 2004; Jain, 2001). Because scholars used different measurements of educational
attainment and the literature overall is relatively new, there is value in studying these variables. The
literature tended to use either Bachelor’s degree attainment or High School Diploma attainment
when measuring educational attainment (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). This study uses both of these
measurements, in addition to per pupil spending on primary and secondary public schools. Scholars
believe that the relationship between education attainment and corruption is negative because
individuals who have more education are more likely to be civically involved and be less tolerant of
government digressions from the public interest (Dimant & Tosato, 2017; Uslaner & Rothstein,
2016). This study’s hypothesis concurs with this view.
The governmental variables considered are much broader in what they measure than the
variables discussed thus far. This group of variables is made up of a set of good government policy
proposals and governmental characteristics that may impact corruption. The only variables in this
category that were previously tested are the proportion of state legislative seats held by women and
governmental dependencies on sales tax. Those scholars that did study these variables found
negative and positive relationships with corruption, respectively. Scholars attribute women in the
legislature’s negative relationship with corruption to a difference in behavior, citing psychological
studies claiming women are more public spirited and trustworthy than men (Dollar et al., 1999).
Scholars argue that sales tax dependency is positively related to corruption because sales-tax
dependent systems benefit wealthy residents at the expense of non-wealthy residents, which
18

indicates the government is not favoring the interests of the general public (Cheol and Mikesell,
2018). This study accepts the relationship hypotheses for both of these variables, although it rejects
the reasoning supporting the women in government variable in favor of more plausible reasoning.
Instead, I believe that increased female participation in elected office reduces corruption because
female elected officials are more likely have come from outside the world of politics, increasing the
likelihood that they will be detached from any cultures of corruption and increasing the probability
that they will be willing to support public spirited ethics reforms.
The good government policy proposals, as previously mentioned, have been covered by no
known corruption studies 16. Some examples of these variables are public campaign financing for
state offices and state legislative term limits. These public campaign financing systems are believed
to reduce corruption because they limit the ability of groups that do not represent the public interest
to influence elected officials and skew government policy. Legislative term limits are believed to
reduce corruption because it reduces the likelihood that officials are ingrained in cultures of
corruption and increases accountability to voters by removing significant incumbency advantages.
Political science scholars have attested to these policies’ ability to increase transparency,
accountability, and citizen access to government (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2014). I therefore expect
the relationship between corruption and implementing each of these reforms to be negative, as each
of these policies is expected to heighten the influence of the public interest in government decisionmaking and increases the cost of unethical actions.
Like the variables in the governmental category, many variables in the electoral category are
untested or undertested. The only variables in this category that were previously tested are voter

Note that those good government variables that were related to elections were tested in the electoral variables
category, while the rest were tested in the governmental category.
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turnout and divided or unified state government. The literature tends to support the claim that voter
turnout and corruption are negatively related, and divided government is positively related to
corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). Scholars disagree on the reason why turnout is negatively
related to corruption, with some claiming high turnout is a voter response to high corruption among
government officials and others claiming that existing high voter turnout deters corruption (CostasPerez, 2014; Glaeser & Saks, 2004). Those scholars who have tested the impact of divided
government believe this relationship is similar to how racial diversity affects corruption, with
divisions making reaction to corruption more difficult and decreasing the cost of corrupt acts
thereby increasing corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). This study adopts the hypothesis that high
voter turnout deters corruption by holding elected officials accountable for their personal and
official actions, while also concurring with the literature’s hypothesis on divided government.
As previously mentioned, many electoral variables studied in this project (campaign
expenditures, small dollar donations 17, etc.) have not been previously tested as to their effect on
levels of corruption. These variables were chosen for analysis because the public has been found to
consider, for example, high-dollar campaign contributions to be indicative of government
corruption (Avkiran, Kanol, & Oliver, 2015; Bowler & Donavan, 2015). Overall, I expect those
variables that are indicative of pervasive financial activity (Aggregate contributions, independent
expenditures, etc.) to have a positive relationship with corruption, and those that reduce the
influence of large donors (public campaign financing, small donor financing and lower individual
contribution limits) to have a negative relationship with corruption. Many onlookers, including
members of the Supreme Court (Briffault, 2011), have testified to the corrosive nature of excessive

Note that complete data for this variable was not readily available from any source, the proportions of Congressional
campaign funding derived from small donations was collected from the Center for Responsive Politics’ campaign
finance database, which is created using data from FEC reports. This data was then sorted by the state the representative
serves and then the proportions were averaged by state.
17
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money in campaigns and its ability to corrupt. Given this fact, one would expect those variables that
reduce the impact of money in campaigns to decrease the prevalence of corruption, and for
variables that indicate excessive money in campaigns to increase corruption.
Once the data was collected, each of the variables were tested for a basic linear association
with the two measurements of corruption 18. Two forms of multiple regression analysis were used,
intra and inter categorical. That is to say, for example, multiple regressions were conducted with all
economic variables as independent variables to explain varying levels of corruption and which
variables in the chosen category best explain variations in corruption 19. The inter category analysis
included different combinations of variables from each of the four categories. This culminated into
4 intra category models and 8 inter category models, not including the modified quadratic and
logarithmic models. Every model used both measurements of corruption, and all the intra variable
models were tested using logarithmic regressions20.
Results
The raw and controlled corruption data highlight interesting trends worth noting. First, the
number of convictions between states can vary widely. In 2011, for example, Alabama had 23
convictions, while Connecticut, a state with a similar population, had 0 convictions. For
comparison, the average, uncontrolled number of corruption convictions per state from 2011-2017
was 18.3. But interestingly, As shown in Figure 2, the average number of convictions each year did
not vary significantly. The adjusted data was similarly invariant, although the both showed a trend

For those variables that had multiple years of data, each year was tested for a basic linear association. Then, multiyear
data was averaged into a single figure for each state.
19 Note that the good government policy questions were only tested for a basic linear association, as their data was
categorical.
20 Variables that had previously been found to have quadratic relationships with corruption were also tested using a
modified quadratic regression model.
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of decreasing convictions from 2011-2014 and an increase from 2015-201721. As shown in Figure
3, the unadjusted conviction dataset has a much higher variance and range when compared to the
two controlled measures of federal convictions. It appears different layers of the data have
drastically different variances, with the differences between individual states each year being
significant and differences in average convictions each year being much smaller.

Average Convictions by Year
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Figure 2: Average Convictions for all States by Year

Convictions
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Convictions (Pop)

18.33428571
2.975276747
10.21428571
2.857142857
21.03838364
442.613586
99.85714286
0.285714286
100.1428571
916.7142857
50

0.313899058
0.033407354
0.25871239
#N/A
0.236225666
0.055802565
1.306643199
0.021703061
1.328346259
15.6949529
50

Convictions (Gov)
4.115095165
0.407426212
3.442480822
#N/A
2.880938377
8.299805931
15.02459555
0.29127769
15.31587324
205.7547583
50

Figure 3: Summary Statistics for 2011-2017 Average Federal Corruption Convictions, Population-Adjusted Convictions,
and Government Employee-Adjusted Convictions
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For the government employee and population adjusted data, see appendix A charts 1-2.
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It is important to understand the details that make up the larger measure of corruption. When
observing individual states from 2011-2017, Texas, California, Florida, Georgia, and New York
have the highest number of convictions, while New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wyoming, Vermont
and Utah have the least. When accounting for population differences, Montana, Louisiana, South
Dakota, Maryland and Oklahoma have the highest incidence of corruption, while New Hampshire,
Utah, Colorado, Oregon and Minnesota have the lowest. The details of these rankings are shown in
Figure 4. Interestingly, when controlling for government employees, the ranks have slight
differences. The employee adjusted ranks are Montana, Louisiana, Maryland, South Dakota and
Georgia as the most corrupt, with the least corrupt being the same as the population ranking. More
government employees in a state decreases the corruption statistic, which is the case of Virginia and
Maryland, states where many Washington D.C. employees reside. A common assumption of
scholars is that government employment levels correlate directly with population. While this is
generally correct, and is supported by this data, it is also shown to not be universally applicable, as
shown with the cases of Virginia and Maryland. This study uses both measurements in all analyses
to minimize the impact of this discrepancy.

23

Figure 4: 2011-2017 Conviction Rates by State

Figure 5 reports the linear associations between the selected independent variables and
corruption, measured by both the population and government employee adjusted indexes. For those
variables that measured multiple years, the correlation for each individual year was averaged. The
full, unaltered list of correlations can be found in Appendix A, table 3. Most variables showed
consistency with respect to their relationship with corruption, however some variables’ average
24

correlations differed significantly from the individual correlations by year. For example, the US
Senate Independent Expenditures variable showed a positive correlation of about .30 in 2012, but in
2014 the correlation was about -.20. Examples like these indicate that the exhaustive list may
provide additional insight into these variables’ relationship with corruption.

25

Figure 5: Correlations Between Selected Variables and Corruption
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Variables in the economic category showed mixed results. Unemployment rate, the number
of Fortune 500 headquarters in a state and state legislators’ salaries appear to have no relationship
with corruption, with correlation indexes having an absolute value of less than 0.05. In contrast, a
state’s median household income, average government employee salaries 22, and state GDP growth
rate appeared to have negative relationships with corruption, with average correlation indexes of
about -.145, -.155 and -.135, respectively. For example, states with lower adjusted median
household incomes, like Louisiana and Montana, had higher levels of corruption, while states with
higher median household incomes, like Colorado and Oregon, had lower levels of corruption. Both
the state GINI index and state poverty rate appear to have a positive impact on corruption, with
average correlation indexes of about .17 and .235, respectively. It appears that most hypotheses
about the role of economic variables at the state level are confirmed.
Variables in the education category appeared to be relatively consistent. Per pupil spending
for primary and secondary students appeared to have no relationship with corruption, having an
average correlation index of less than -.05. Bachelor’s degree and high school diploma attainment,
however, appeared to have negative relationships, with average correlation indexes of about -.175
and -.23, respectively. For example, states with high bachelor’s degree attainment, like Connecticut
and North Dakota, had lower levels of corruption, while states with lower bachelor’s degree
attainments, like Mississippi and Arkansas, had higher levels of corruption. These results indicate
that the hypotheses about educational variables are confirmed. These differences also imply that
high school diploma attainment may be a better predictor of corruption than bachelor’s degree
attainment.
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This variable and the median household income were both adjusted for a state’s cost of living.
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Like the economic category, the governmental category showed mixed results. Aside from
single party control of state government and states with public campaign financing systems for state
offices, each variable appeared to have a relationship with corruption. An independently elected
state Attorney General23, state legislative term limits, gubernatorial term limits and the Center for
Public Integrity’s state government transparency index all appeared to have positive relationships
with corruption, with average correlation indexes of about .21, .29, .27 and .12, respectively 24.
These results are contrary to the predicted hypotheses, implying these policies may not directly
reduce corruption25. Those variables that had a negative impact on corruption were the proportion of
state legislative seats held by women, the proportion of state revenue deriving from sales tax, and
the proportion of state and local revenue deriving from sales tax, with average correlation indexes
of about -.235, -.15 and -.16, respectively. Only the women in state legislatures variable matched
the initial hypothesis, indicating that sales tax dependency may not be as strong an indicator of
corruption as some previous scholars believe (Liu & Mikesell, 2018).
Lastly, the voting and electoral category showed mixed results. There results were not mixed
in that results showed both positive and negative relationships with corruption but because they
both challenge and confirm the findings of previous scholars. Aggregate campaign contributions for
federal elections in a state, state individual campaign contribution limits, and independent
expenditures in US Senate races showed no relationship with corruption, having average correlation
indexes with an absolute value of less than .05. Those voting and electoral variables that did show a
relationship with corruption showed a negative one, and they were voter turnout measured by voter

This variable’s significance may be limited as the independent variable showed little variation between the states—
most states in the United States have independently elected state Attorneys General.
24 It should be noted that for the five variables mentioned in this category thus far, only the status of the variable in the
year 2017 (2015 in the case of the transparency index) was observed.
25 It is possible that because federal conviction records are mostly made up of civil service-level offenders, changes to
the incentives and behaviors of elected officials at the state level have a minimal impact on the overall statistic.
23
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eligible turnout, voter turnout measured by voter age turnout, the extent of gerrymandering in a
state’s congressional districts and the proportion of federal legislators’ financing coming from small
campaign contributions 26. The average correlation indexes for these variables were about -.145, .12, -.36 and -.21, respectively. Each of these indexes matches the initial hypotheses, with the
exception of the gerrymandering variables. These results indicate that certain electoral policies may
help to reduce corruption.
While most of the selected variables appeared to have the hypothesized relationships with
corruption, the form and shape of these relationships can differ. For example, high school diploma
attainment, the percentage of state legislative seats held by women, and the state poverty rate all
appeared to have notable relationships with corruption (that were negative, negative and positive,
respectively). The scatterplots for these variables (Figures 6, 7, and 8), however, indicate that these
linear relationships take different forms. The educational attainment variable seems to have had less
variation in states’ high school diploma attainment rates (a range of about 12%) than the proportion
of women in state legislatures (a range of about 26%). These differences remind us that changes in
each of the independent variables associated with changes in corruption are not necessarily of the
same amount27. Furthermore, a similar correlation index does not necessarily associate with the
same change in the corruption.

It should be noticed that most electoral variables’ data was used only during midterm or Presidential election years, as
data was only available for those years.
27 For example, a 1% change in HS Graduation attainment may be associated with a larger change in corruption than say
a 1% change in women holding state legislative seats.
26
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Corruption and HS Educational Attainment
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Figure 6: Corruption (adjusted for government employees) compared to HS Diploma (and Higher) Attainment

Corruption and Women in State Legislatures
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Figure 7: Corruption (controlled for government employees) compared to the proportion
of Women Occupying State Legislative Seats
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Figure 8: Corruption (controlled for government employees) compared to the proportion of Congressional and US Senate
Campaign funding from Small Dollar Contributions in 2012

The data just reported were correlations, the following are summaries and tables of the
various regression models. Figure 9 reports the coefficient, R-squared, and statistical significances
for each of the 8 population-adjusted inter category models, while Figure 10 reports the same
information for the government employee-adjusted inter category models. Those variables whose
coefficient’s p-value was below 0.10 are noted accordingly. It appears that the government
employee-adjusted measure of corruption was more closely related to the selected variables, and
that a state’s GINI index and poverty rate are the best determinants of the state’s federal corruption
convictions. Also, notwithstanding the differences between the models, each explains less than 25%
of the variance in corruption. This does not, however, preclude the results of this study from being
instructive, as corruption is a difficult variable to explain.
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Dependent Variable: Corruption Convictions (per hundred thousand state residents)
Independent Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Median Household Income
0.000
------State and Local Employee Compensation
-0.000
----0.000
GDP Growth Rate
---2.178
-2.377
-2.143
-2.703
-Bachelor's Degree Attainment
-0.690
-0.389
-0.686
--0.682
0.464
High School Diploma Attainment
----0.362
0.354
--GINI Index
1.853
1.981
2.382
1.696
---Poverty Rate
----2.276
2.711
1.946
Proportion of Women in State Legislatures
-0.534
-0.320
-0.607
-0.840
-0.569
-0.738
-0.637
State Sales Tax Dependency
-0.323
-0.346
-0.296
-0.244
-0.300
-0.266
-0.324
Voter Eligible Turnout
-0.159
-0.283
-0.164
-0.238
-0.137
-0.129
-0.307
Financing from Small Campaign Contributions
-0.398
-0.426
-0.212
-0.195
-0.472
-0.362
-R-Squared
0.133
0.145
0.15
0.139
0.164
0.171
0.146
*, **, and *** indicate that the coefficents are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.

-0.000
-0.334
--1.851
--0.336
-0.295
-0.811
0.144

Figure 9: Inter category multiple regression models of the determinants of population-adjusted corruption

Dependent Variable: Corruption Convictions (per hundred thousand government employees)
Independent Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Median Household Income
0.000
-------State and Local Employee Compensation
-0.000
----0.000
0.000
GDP Growth Rate
---27.040 -30.655 -26.184 -32.776
--Bachelor's Degree Attainment
-10.358
-7.130
-11.038
--12.627
9.555
8.258
High School Diploma Attainment
----9.674
-8.051
---GINI Index
42.074* 44.256* 49.193** 34.489
----Poverty Rate
----27.934 44.926** 36.120* 35.034*
Proportion of Women in State Legislatures
-3.703
-1.146
-4.853
-8.260
-4.297
-7.398
-6.993
-State Sales Tax Dependency
-3.036
-3.319
-2.679
-1.859
-2.559
-2.054
-2.739
-2.817
Voter Eligible Turnout
-1.978
-3.342
-1.774
-2.376
-0.300
-1.739
-3.920
-3.283
Financing from Small Campaign Contributions
-5.106
-5.349
-2.666
-2.097
-5.787
-6.281
--11.053
R-Squared
0.182
0.196
0.2
0.182
0.195
0.209
0.18
0.183
*, **, and *** indicate that the coefficents are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.

Figure 10: Inter category multiple regression models of the determinants of government employee-adjusted corruption

GDP growth rate showed a consistent and strong negative relationship with corruption,
although the coefficients for this variable were not statistically significant. For example, in model 4,
GDP growth rate had a coefficient of -2.377. Also, it appears that those models that incorporated
GDP growth rate (models 5 and 6, for example) were more successful at explaining corruption, than
those that included median household income or state and local government employee
compensation. Median household income and state and local government employee compensation
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consistently showed no predictive relationship with corruption, having a coefficient of zero in every
inter category model the variables were used.
The economic disparity variables proved to have the strongest predictive relationships with
corruption. Both of these variables showed consistently positive relationships with corruption, and
in the most successful models these variables’ coefficients had p-values below 0.05 in multiple
models. In the most successful model, model 6 (which had an R-squared of .209), the state poverty
rate variable had a coefficient of 44.926, which indicates that for every 1% increase in a state’s
poverty rate, there is an associated increase of 0.45 convictions per 100,000 government employees.
Similarly, GINI Index had a coefficient of 49.193 in the second most successful model, model 3
(which had an R-squared of 0.20). This coefficient indicated that for every 1% increase in a state’s
GINI Index, there is an associated increase of 0.49 convictions per 100,000 government employees.
Educational variables showed slightly inconsistent relationships with corruption, sometimes
showing positive relationships but usually showing negative relationships. When observing the
population-adjusted corruption models, some showed bachelor’s degree attainment having a
positive relationship with corruption (For example, model 6 with a coefficient of 0.682) while
others showed a negative relationship with corruption (For example, model 3 with a coefficient of .686). Notably, every model that included the poverty rate with bachelor’s degree attainment
showed this positive relationship for the bachelor’s degree variable. Thus the relationship between
poverty and education attainment may be impacting this seemingly positive relationship. When
observing the models using the government employee-adjusted measure of corruption, however, the
two education variables more consistently showed a negative relationship with corruption. None of
the coefficients of the education variables were statistically significant.
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Governmental variables showed consistency with respect to their relationships with
corruption. Every one of these variables showed a consistent, negative relationship with corruption,
though the strength of this relationship varied. For example, in model 1, the proportion of state
women occupying legislative seats had a coefficient of -0.534, while the coefficient for sales tax
dependency was -0.323. The sales tax dependency variable, which consistently showed a negative
relationship, was unexpected, given the literature’s support for a positive relationship. None of the
coefficients for these governmental variables were statistically significant.
The electoral variables tested in this model also showed a consistent linear relationship with
corruption. Both voter eligible turnout and financing from small campaign contributions showed
negative relationships with corruption in each model they were part of. Financing from small
campaign contributions had a stronger negative relationship with corruption than did voter eligible
turnout in all models except for one. Interestingly, financing from small campaign contributions had
the largest coefficient in the model that did not include the women in state legislatures variable.
Like the educational and governmental variables, none of these coefficients were statistically
significant.
Of all the independent variables tested using intra category linear regressions, three showed
statistical significance, each at the 0.1 level: a state’s poverty rate, high school diploma attainment
(or higher), and the proportion of state legislative seats occupied by women 28. These variables
showed negative, positive and negative relationships with corruption, respectively. When observing
economic variables in the intra category models, unemployment, GINI Index and GDP growth rate
showed positive and negative relationships with corruption, respectively. When observing education
variables in the intra category models, both bachelor’s degree and high school diploma attainment

28

The results for all intra category regressions are provided in Appendix A, tables 4-8.
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variables showed a negative relationship with corruption. Of governmental variables, state sales tax
dependency showed a positive relationship with corruption, while state and local sales tax
dependency showed a negative relationship with corruption. Lastly, in the electoral category, small
contributions and voter eligible turnout showed negative relationships with corruption, while voter
age turnout showed a positive relationship with corruption.
When using the population-adjusted measure of corruption, only the proportion of women in
a state’s legislature had a statistically significant coefficient, with a p-value of 0.068. In this model,
each 1% increase in the proportion of women occupying seats in a state’s legislature is associated
with a decrease of 0.012 corruption convictions per 100,000 people29. It should also be noted that
voter eligible turnout (VEP30), which had a negative relationship with corruption, was close to
showing statistical significance at the 0.10 level. When comparing the variable to the populationadjusted corruption measure, the variable’s coefficient had a p-value of 0.115.
When observing the government-controlled corruption measure with the selected variables,
high school diploma attainment, a state’s poverty rate, and the proportion of state legislative seats
occupied by women had statistically significant coefficients. Each was significant at the .10 level,
with the p-values being 0.074, 0.082, and 0.073, respectively. In this model, each 1% increase in the
proportion of residents with a High School diploma or more education was associated with a
decrease of 0.25 corruption convictions per 100,000 government employees. Each 1% increase in
the poverty rate was associated with an increase of 0.34 corruption convictions per 100,000
government employees. Each 1% increase in the proportion of state legislative seats occupied by

This may seem insignificant, but when accounting for population or government employees, the potential effect is
significant. Say a state has 10 million residents. According to this equation, if residents elected just 1% more women to
the state legislature, there will be an average of 1.2 fewer convictions in that state.
30 VEP is the population of people who are registered to vote and, if applicable, enrolled in a political party. VAP is the
population of voters who qualify to vote but may or may not be registered.
29
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women, was associated with a decrease of 0.20 corruption convictions per 100,000 government
employees.
The three variables whose coefficients were statistically significance using a linear
regression with a government employee-adjusted corruption measurement were also significant
when testing using a logarithmic regression with a government employee-adjusted measurement of
corruption. The p-values for the three variables, a state’s poverty rate, high school diploma
attainment (or higher), and the proportion of state legislative seats occupied by women were 0.092,
0.087 and 0.06, respectively. The proportion of state legislative seats occupied by women also
showed statistical significance at the 0.10 level when using the population controlled corruption
measure, with its p-value being 0.060. No variables tested for quadratic relationships showed to be
statistically significant.
Data Limitations
While this study raises interesting and important questions with regards to the study of
corruption, its results must be considered in context of its limitations. First, as has been stated in
several instances, these data observe correlations. Statistical significance in this study does not
imply that variables cause one another to change, although such causation is possible. Rather, they
show that a relationship exists between the variables.
There are important limitations of the conviction records used for this study. These records
do not include information on state and local corruption convictions, which exists throughout the
United States (Henning, 2003; Murphy, 2019). Some scholars have also made claims that these
annual reports do not include all federal prosecutor activity due to errors in reporting (Cortis &
Miylo, 2013). Also, because the DOJ reports aggregate convictions, there is no way to determine
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how serious the conviction was. We can assume, though, that because of limited time and
personnel, US Attorneys would only prosecute cases that were in some way significant. Only
having aggregate data also raises the possibility that some states’ corruption measures, particularly
those with few convictions, were skewed by individual decisions, creating the illusion that a culture
of corruption exists. It is also possible that the outcomes of active or pending cases in 2017 (of
which there were 521) might impact the measure.
There are also limitations related to the independent variables. It should be noted that most
data for this study was derived from surveys—the Decennial Census, the American Community
Survey, Council on State Governments data, and others, which are subject to error. The census data
in particular (as it is about 10 years old) may be subject to error. The US Census Bureau, however,
does conduct smaller annual population surveys that are intended to serve as a bellwether for
population changes in between the Decennial Census. When using the most recent of this data from
2019, there were no differences in the statistical significance of the variables, although p-values,
coefficients and other indicators did change slightly. Likewise, the data used to calculate the
number of government employees may also be subject to error, as it also dates from 2010. Also,
some variables’ correlation indexes may have been impacted by their low variances, like the GINI
Index.
The impact of lurking variables and reverse causation should also be noted. Some scholars
in the literature noted that their findings may have differed depending on whether corruption is an
independent or dependent variable (Choudhury, 2018; Heywood, 1997). For example, voter turnout
may be a reaction to high corruption or a cause of low corruption. Even a variable like the
proportion of state legislative seats held by women may itself be impacted by the prevalence of
corruption. Also, variables like educational attainment and poverty may be impacted by other
37

explanatory variables, like the median household income or GDP growth rate. This possibility is
highlighted by Figure 11, which shows the correlations between the independent variables used in
this study. Some variables, like the educational indicators and the state poverty rate, are highly
correlated, which may have skewed the results. Lastly, it should be noted that previous scholars
have found that the extent a population is urbanized reflects its corruption level (Dimant and
Tosato, 2017), but this was not controlled for.

Correlations Between Independent Variables
Median Household Income
Median Household Income
State and Local Employee Compensation
GDP Growth Rate
Bachelor's Degree Attainment
High School Diploma Attainment
GINI Index
Poverty Rate
Proportion of Women in State Legislatures
State Sales Tax Dependency
Voter Eligible Turnout
Financing from Small Campaign Contributions

1
0.927937852
-0.154677857
0.673945989
0.292506883
-0.126275703
-0.659112768
0.505803689
-0.25962114
0.1457025
0.18360718

SL Compensation
1
-0.11810342
0.60959333
0.171530559
0.053273501
-0.507474703
0.524358918
-0.23595938
0.130733578
0.190479132

GDP Growth Rate

1
0.066233306
-0.23089998
0.275490032
0.187294071
-0.019607915
0.125624241
-0.068669602
0.065651785

Bachelors Degree

HS Diploma

GINI

1
0.449092528
1
0.021943905 -0.725172309
1
-0.727287136 -0.76986246 0.540567617
0.551202562 0.442276052 -0.177537946
-0.357510054 -0.264784294 0.148560488
0.472571264 0.598425342 -0.271286705
0.333342834 0.471369665 -0.271956566

Poverty Rate

1
-0.433211117
0.321531801
-0.483146742
-0.313119416

Women in Legislature Sales Dependency

1
-0.145701451
0.419685542
0.506650107

VEP

Small Contributions

1
-0.352992095
1
-0.112901776 0.471506999

Figure 11: Correlations Between Independent Variables

Discussion
The results of this study raise important questions and provide insight into the causes and
effects of corruption. Overall, the results suggest that those policies that decrease the incidence of
poverty and wealth disparities, increase high school graduation rates, promote female participation
in elected state legislative office, and, to a lesser extent, increase voter turnout, will have the effect
of decreasing corruption. These results thus have several implications for policymakers. These
results also imply that using a government employee-controlled measure of corruption may be a
more accurate measure of corruption than using population.
The education variable, as was asserted by much of the literature (Dimant & Tosato, 2017),
appears to be negatively related to the level of corruption. The interesting caveat of this result,
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however, is which educational indicator showed this relationship. Neither bachelor’s degree
attainment (or higher) nor primary and secondary spending per pupil showed a statistically
significant relationship with corruption, although high school diploma attainment (or higher) did.
The variances between this variable and the high school diploma variable were quite similar,
eliminating that mathematical explanation for the difference. This leaves open the question of why
high school diploma attainment is more strongly related to corruption levels. It is possible that high
school diploma attainment more accurately reflects the education of the entirety of a state’s
population, whereas bachelor’s degree attainment reflects the education of only a segment of the
population (less than half of state residents usually have bachelor’s degrees). These results also
invoke the possibility that people may only need a high school education to understand government
enough to make educated voting decisions and to avoid ethical dilemmas when employed by or
engaging with a public entity. It is also possible that because low high school graduation rates
indicate that high poverty rates exist, it is poor economic opportunity in a state that explains this
difference31.
The women in state legislatures variable, discussed least in the literature, was the highest
performing intra category variable in terms of its regression equation strength and correlation index.
Considering that this variable is unlikely to be influenced by reverse causation (which variables in
the other categories may be susceptible to), these results are notable. Previous studies found
attributed this relationship to a purported fact that women are inherently “more trust-worthy and
public spirited” than men, which these authors claim is supported by behavioral studies (Dollar et
al., 1999). It should be noted that this position has not been taken by many scholars and has not
been tested directly through interviewing or surveying female government officials. It is also

Bachelor’s degree attainment was only highly correlated with the GINI Index, while high school diploma attainment
was highly correlated with both the GINI Index and poverty rates.
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possible that this trend is explained by women’s permeation of many employment sectors in recent
decades. Because many female elected officials and employees are new, they may be less likely to
be entrenched in institutional corruption and subsequently end up being prosecuted by federal law
enforcement. This outsider perspective may also induce states with more female legislators to adopt
stronger anti-corruption laws, deterring potential corrupt acts (whether they be state or federal
violations).
This study found strong support for the claim that an increase in a state’s poverty rate and
GINI index result in an increase in the level of that state’s level of corruption. Much of the literature
attested to the positive relationship between each of these variables and corruption (Dimant &
Tosato, 2017), although there is some disagreement on which variable is independent (Dincer &
Gunlap, 2008). The cause of this association may be that high poverty rates are associated with
other variables that affect corruption, such as (low) education attainment. It is also possible that
high poverty indicates an economic situation where people are more willing to accept corruption in
government (or have less time to monitor government activity) because they are occupied providing
for themselves and their families. And as the literature mentions, it is also possible that high poverty
is in fact an effect of corruption in government that results in mismanagement of finances, causing
social assistance programs to decline.
Voter turnout measured by VEP appeared to remedy corruption, similar to the findings of
the literature (Choudhury, 2018; Costas-Perez, 2014). Interestingly, though, was that voter turnout
measured by VAP showed weaker results, with its strongest regression coefficient’s p-value being
around 0.20. This may indicate that if a baseline proportion of the population is engaged in
government affairs, that will be enough to ensure elected officials make decisions according to
public needs and that they do not incentivize corruption by support interest groups in place of the
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public interest or engage in corrupt acts themselves. It is also conceivable that educational
attainment, which is widely considered to be positively associated with high voter turnout,
influenced this connection.
The results of this study highlight several types of policies that appear to reduce the level of
corruption in a jurisdiction. This study shows that differences in the level of corruption are unlikely
to be entirely attributable to individuals’ ethical choices. Factors like education levels, economic
health, wealth distribution and civic engagement can all impact corruption levels. Generally, this
study shows that a healthy society (with less wealth disparities and poverty) will have less
corruption. This means that societies that have minimal economic and educational inequities and
strong civic engagement are those that will have the lowest levels of corruption. Policymakers, then,
should focus on ameliorating disparities, possibly by expanding educational and economic
opportunities to individuals and communities that are that currently face social, economic, and in
some cases political, barriers.
Considering the results of the women in legislatures variable, some electoral reforms may
also be desirable. If this study’s explanation of this relationship is correct, then it is not that women
themselves are the reason for this difference, but that women are more likely to be newly elected
officials, unconnected to any cultures of corruption. These individuals would be more likely to
support ethical reforms32. Policies that would reduce corruption, then, would eliminate barriers for
women and other groups that are underrepresented in elected office. For example, some states have
allowed for elected officials to be provided with childcare services. Another policy would be to
moderately compensate candidates for elected office, which would allow people with limited

Some studies have found that US state legislators have different attitudes towards corruption depending on their
representative region (Welch & Peters, 1977). It seems likely that one’s prior involvement in public life would have
some impact on this attitude as well.
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incomes to participate in public life. These forms of policies would likely incorporate new views
into policymaking discussions, leading to policies that would discourage unethical behavior.
Despite the progress made by this study, there are still various variables that need to be
tested, retested and expanded upon. There should be future inquiry into how the racial and ethnic
diversity of a community affects government corruption. Previous studies had found that increased
diversity leads to political fragmentation, which strengthens the opportunity for bad actors to
successfully engage in corruption without recourse (Dimant & Tosato, 2017). This study’s
preliminary findings on campaign finance variables should also be further developed in future
research. Campaign finance can be more easily controlled by policymakers than say, wealth
disparities, so if these electoral reforms were found to significantly reduce corruption, they would
be powerful policy tools.
Based upon the results and experiences of conducting this study, I would make three
recommendations for future research. First, future researchers should prioritize collecting
experimental data wherever possible, as the literature is almost entirely based on observational data.
The variables that were found to be viable in this study could conceivably be tested in a controlled
setting33. Second, scholars should continue to confirm or disconfirm existing studies’ findings,
thereby building the strength of the literature34. If the findings of corruption studies are to be
valuable to policymakers, there must be a robust body of evidence supporting theoretical assertions.
Lastly, future studies should be liberal in the variables they choose to test. Corruption is amorphous,
meaning it does not belong to any one industry, sector of society, or field of study. Testing new

For example, similar men and women could be placed in hypothetical ethical scenarios that are associated with
corruption, such as whether they would be willing to take a bribe.
34 These studies would also benefit from observing corruption levels and chosen variables over time, which may be
useful in dissecting whether reverse causation is occurring in some comparisons.
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variables will help to broaden the instructiveness of scholars’ findings and inform the existing views
of this developing field of inquiry. If these recommendations are incorporated into future studies, I
believe scholars will be better equipped to fully understand corruption and make high-quality
recommendations to reduce its ubiquity.
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Table 1: Average Convictions by Year (adjusted for population)
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Table 2: Average Convictions by Year (adjusted for government employees)
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Table 3: Associations Between Selected Variables and Corruption by Year
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Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)

-0.081453523
-0.355838014
-0.162674913
-0.151218116
-0.190430675
-0.103958057
-0.102003668
-0.096936018
-0.392811853
-0.165412314
-0.179307862
-0.219380604
-0.124893603
-0.119894378
-0.108166268
-0.392444403
-0.391064973
-0.147038518
-0.233919453
-0.020204248
-0.004471954
-0.257803373
-0.453313492
-0.463228745
-0.198628723
-0.343485479
-0.07873983
-0.06005149
0.128607876
-0.019303329
0.015481425
-0.068964184
-0.037743538
-0.094156238
-0.120304744
0.064222218
-0.104015991
-0.026433098
-0.08919671
-0.090433457
-0.121777545
-0.131997952
-0.097932668
0.083509879
0.277399675
0.098111841
0.276743958
0.15011126
0.073568836

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2100
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Gini Index
Gini Index
Gini Index
Gini Index
Gini Index
Gini Index
Gini Index
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate
Poverty Rate

Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)

0.071237391
0.211667983
0.37492572
0.153482069
0.406640925
0.216410581
0.126769994
0.052468516
0.210375904
0.211763306
0.260740857
0.334332032
0.199227795
0.13009581
0.173910745
0.315546165
0.262545374
0.306094682
0.417130852
0.248390673
0.174238116

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
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Independent AG
Independent AG
Legislative Term Limits
Legislative Term Limits
Governor Term Limits
Governor Term Limits
One Party State Control
One Party State Control
One Party State Control
One Party State Control
One Party State Control
One Party State Control
Public Campaign Financing
Public Campaign Financing
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
Women in the Legislature
State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
State Revenue from Sales Tax
State Revenue from Sales Tax
Transparency Index
Transparency Index
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VEP
Voter Turnout VAP
Voter Turnout VAP
Voter Turnout VAP
Voter Turnout VAP
Voter Turnout VAP
Voter Turnout VAP
Gerrymandering 1
Gerrymandering 1
Gerrymandering 2
Gerrymandering 2
Gerrymandering 3
Gerrymandering 3
Gerrymandering 4
Gerrymandering 4
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Aggregate Campaign Contributions
Small Dollar Campaign Donations
Small Dollar Campaign Donations
Individual Campaign Contribution Limit
Individual Campaign Contribution Limit
Individual Campaign Contribution Limit
Individual Campaign Contribution Limit
Individual Contribution Limit (adjusted)
Individual Contribution Limit (adjusted)
Individual Contribution Limit (adjusted)
Individual Contribution Limit (adjusted)
Senate Race Independent Expenditures
Senate Race Independent Expenditures
Senate Race Independent Expenditures
Senate Race Independent Expenditures
Senate Race Independent Expenditures
Senate Race Independent Expenditures

Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per pop)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)
Corruption (per gov't)

53

0.239158382
0.182257426
0.274343504
0.30844626
0.228358897
0.33309617
0.30744496
-0.089087081
-0.077403394
0.218071425
-0.036369648
-0.310996787
0.178918429
-0.03950104
-0.357915291
-0.416718566
-0.382804861
-0.075553021
-0.225556123
-0.007572543
-0.145242059
-0.326094808
-0.396553342
-0.430815442
-0.083907889
-0.256561642
-0.035036814
-0.158239337
-0.137738577
-0.178670527
-0.128598108
-0.181271874
0.133714409
0.113387326
-0.320324203
-0.088262297
0.023236847
-0.350040504
-0.137227153
0.008322175
-0.248357964
-0.048248893
-0.040131869
-0.305430952
-0.102536198
0.018695872
-0.338210073
-0.337711317
-0.367266035
-0.363627062
-0.474480627
-0.482180734
-0.283276639
-0.26401695
-0.043478655
-0.026519616
-0.031007886
0.033865757
0.003247796
0.001522637
-0.203777721
-0.221593568
0.111903444
-0.015477877
0.136789355
-0.005657566
0.107375874
-0.062144602
0.124535797
-0.051305323
0.261184939
-0.215178148
-0.142310196
0.299571372
-0.21627535
-0.092590998

2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016
2017
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016
2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2017
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016
2012
2012
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2015
2016
2012
2014
2016
2012
2014
2016

Table 4: Intra Category Linear Regressions for Selected Variables using Population-Adjusted Measure of Corruption
Regression Statistics for Population Adjusted Corruption
Coefficients
0.435
1.458
0.000
0.000
0.000
-2.133

t Stat
1.864
0.547
0.582
0.102
-1.019
-0.933

1.505
-0.757
-1.179

1.600
-0.883
-1.005

0.116
0.382
0.320

-0.388
-2.483
-3.540

3.399
0.968
1.183

0.000

0.400

0.691

0.000

0.000

Intercept
GINI Index
Poverty Rate

-0.147
0.382
1.968

-0.170
0.186
1.553

0.866
0.853
0.127

-1.885
-3.749
-0.581

1.592
4.513
4.517

Intercept
Women in the State's Legislature
Proportion of State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
Proportion of State Revenue from Sales Tax
Government Transparency Index

0.571
-1.145
0.422
-0.477
0.001

1.273
-1.871
0.644
-0.972
0.149

0.210
0.068
0.523
0.336
0.882

-0.333
-2.378
-0.899
-1.465
-0.013

1.476
0.088
1.743
0.511
0.015

Intercept
Voting Eligible Turnout
Voting Age Turnout
Overall Campaign Contributions
Campaign Funding Through Small Contributions
Individual Contribution Limits for Legislative Offices
Independent Expenditures for Senate Campaigns
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

0.533
-2.437
2.394
0.000
-1.058
0.000
0.000

1.690
-1.610
1.422
0.657
-0.971
-0.502
-1.029

0.098
0.115
0.162
0.515
0.337
0.618
0.309

-0.103
-5.489
-1.000
0.000
-3.257
0.000
0.000

1.169
0.615
5.787
0.000
1.140
0.000
0.000

Intercept
Unemplyoment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
High School Diploma or Higher
Primary and Secondary Per Pupil Spending
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P-value
Lower 95%
0.069
-0.035
0.587
-3.916
0.564
0.000
0.919
0.000
0.314
0.000
0.356
-6.743

Upper 95%
0.904
6.831
0.000
0.000
0.000
2.476

Table 5: Intra Category Linear Regressions for Selected Variables using Government Employee-Adjusted Measure of Corruption
Regression Statistics for Government Employee Adjusted Corruption
Coefficients
4.509
34.967
0.000
0.000
0.000
-21.191

t Stat
1.603
1.087
0.442
0.437
-1.012
-0.768

P-value
0.116
0.283
0.660
0.664
0.317
0.447

Lower 95%
-1.158
-29.850
0.000
0.000
0.000
-76.796

Upper 95%
10.176
99.784
0.000
0.000
0.000
34.413

27.897
-6.447
-25.425

2.505
-0.635
-1.831

0.016
0.528
0.074

5.484
-26.873
-53.380

50.310
13.978
2.530

0.000

0.125

0.901

0.000

0.000

-9.851
21.978
26.426

-0.973
0.914
1.780

0.336
0.366
0.082

-30.217
-26.422
-3.442

10.516
70.379
56.294

Intercept
Women in the State's Legislature
Proportion of State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
Proportion of State Revenue from Sales Tax
Government Transparency Index

6.443
-13.798
4.575
-3.952
0.018

1.168
-1.835
0.568
-0.656
0.211

0.249
0.073
0.573
0.515
0.834

-4.663
-28.941
-11.648
-16.087
-0.157

17.549
1.345
20.798
8.183
0.194

Intercept
Voting Eligible Turnout
Voting Age Turnout
Overall Campaign Contributions
Campaign Funding Through Small Contributions
Individual Contribution Limits for Legislative Offices
Independent Expenditures for Senate Campaigns
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

8.129
-24.398
20.524
0.000
-13.352
0.000
0.000

2.100
-1.314
0.994
0.751
-0.998
-0.650
-0.574

0.042
0.196
0.326
0.456
0.324
0.519
0.569

0.324
-61.844
-21.111
0.000
-40.321
-0.001
0.000

15.935
13.047
62.160
0.000
13.617
0.000
0.000

Intercept
Unemplyoment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
High School Diploma or Higher
Primary and Secondary Per Pupil Spending
Intercept
GINI Index
Poverty Rate

Table 6: Intra Category Quadratic Regressions for Selected Variables using both Measures of Corruption
Quadratic Regression Statistics for Population Adjusted Corruption
Intercept
Unemployment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
GINI Index
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

Coefficients
1.324
-1991.142
0.000
0.000
0.000
-18.015

t Stat
0.145
-1.077
0.265
0.230
0.378
-0.287

P-value
0.886
0.288
0.792
0.819
0.708
0.776

Lower 95%
-17.188
-5727.119
0.000
0.000
0.000
-144.912

-5.732
-23.940

-0.394
-0.350

0.695
0.728

-34.974
-161.709

Upper 95%
19.837
1744.834
0.000
0.000
0.000
108.883
23.510
113.828

Quadratic Regression Statistics for Government Employee Adjusted Corruption
Intercept
Unemployment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
Gini Index
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

Coefficients
0.361
-1984.428
0.000
0.000
0.000
-495.796

t Stat
0.039
-1.066
0.259
0.196
0.362
-0.656

P-value
0.969
0.293
0.797
0.846
0.720
0.516

Lower 95%
-18.535
-5750.389
0.000
0.000
0.000
-2025.608

-136.334
-564.397

-0.798
-0.701

0.429
0.487

-480.237
-2184.653
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Upper 95%
19.257
1781.533
0.000
0.000
0.000
1034.017
207.570
1055.859

Table 7: Intra Category Logarithmic Regressions for Selected Variables using Population-Adjusted Measure of Corruption
Lograthmic Regression Statistics for Population Adjusted Corruption
Coefficients
2.280
0.275
0.620
-0.006
-0.975
-0.036

t Stat
1.701
0.688
0.678
-0.287
-1.091
-0.370

P-value
0.096
0.495
0.501
0.775
0.281
0.713

Lower 95%
-0.422
-0.529
-1.222
-0.052
-2.776
-0.233

1.505
-0.757
-1.179
0.000

1.600
-0.883
-1.005
0.400

0.116
0.382
0.320
0.691

-0.388
-2.483
-3.540
0.000

3.399
0.968
1.183
0.000

1.002
0.622
0.472

1.621
1.471
0.215

0.112
0.148
0.831

-0.242
-0.229
-3.942

2.245
1.474
4.886

Intercept
Women in the State's Legislature
Proportion of State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
Proportion of State Revenue from Sales Tax
Government Transparency Index

-0.903
-0.631
0.029
-0.111
0.494

-0.434
-1.929
0.159
-0.532
0.435

0.666
0.060
0.874
0.597
0.666

-5.095
-1.291
-0.343
-0.530
-1.796

3.288
0.028
0.401
0.308
2.785

Intercept
Voting Eligible Turnout
Voting Age Turnout
Overall Campaign Contributions
Campaign Funding Through Small Contributions
Independent Expenditures for Senate Campaigns
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

0.053
-1.903
1.574
-0.016
-0.173
0.021

0.093
-1.108
0.942
-0.190
-0.834
0.568

0.926
0.274
0.351
0.851
0.409
0.573

-1.089
-5.364
-1.795
-0.188
-0.591
-0.054

1.195
1.559
4.943
0.155
0.245
0.096

Intercept
Unemployment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
High School Diploma or Higher
Primary and Secondary Per Pupil Spending
Intercept
Poverty Rate
GINI Index

Upper 95%
4.982
1.079
2.462
0.039
0.826
0.160

Table 8: Intra Category Logarithmic Regressions for Government Employee-Adjusted Corruption
Lograthmic Regression Statistics for Government Employee Adjusted Corruption
Coefficients
32.905
5.741
5.644
-0.015
-10.648
-1.118

t Stat
2.060
1.208
0.518
-0.057
-1.000
-0.963

P-value
0.045
0.234
0.607
0.955
0.323
0.341

Lower 95%
0.714
-3.838
-16.296
-0.553
-32.100
-3.459

-6.539
-5.361
-49.074
1.181

-0.351
-0.765
-1.750
0.287

0.727
0.448
0.087
0.776

-44.041
-19.470
-105.530
-7.115

30.964
8.749
7.382
9.477

19.387
8.522
23.893

2.679
1.720
0.930

0.010
0.092
0.357

4.831
-1.445
-27.773

33.943
18.490
75.558

Intercept
Women in the State's Legislature
Proportion of State and Local Revenue from Sales Tax
Proportion of State Revenue from Sales Tax
Government Transparency Index

-13.782
-7.715
1.172
-0.465
7.749

-0.531
-1.932
0.558
-0.283
0.544

0.598
0.060
0.580
0.779
0.589

-66.066
-15.757
-3.057
-3.783
-20.958

38.502
0.327
5.401
2.852
36.456

Intercept
Voting Eligible Turnout
Voting Age Turnout
Overall Campaign Contributions
Campaign Funding Through Small Contributions
Independent Expenditures for Senate Campaigns
Note: Highlighted Yellow if p < 0.1

-4.127
-22.796
17.088
0.342
-2.382
0.282

-0.601
-1.096
0.844
0.332
-0.948
0.624

0.551
0.279
0.403
0.742
0.348
0.536

-17.954
-64.708
-23.701
-1.736
-7.448
-0.629

9.701
19.116
57.876
2.420
2.684
1.193

Intercept
Unemployment Rate
Median Household Income
State Legislator Salaries
State and Local Gov't Compensation
State GDP Growth Rate
Intercept
Bachelor's Degree or Higher
High School Diploma or Higher
Primary and Secondary Per Pupil Spending
Intercept
Poverty Rate
GINI Index
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Upper 95%
65.095
15.320
27.584
0.523
10.804
1.223

